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Summary
In the past year, there has been increasing attention by the press and policymakers
on the effects of crime and gang violence in Central America, and  its spillover effects
on the United States. The February 2005 arrest of some 103 members of the violent
Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) gang in several cities across the United States — including
a man charged in connection with a December 2004 bus massacre in Honduras that
killed 28 people — raises concerns about the transnational activities of Central
American gangs.   Citizens in several Central American countries have identified crime
and gang violence among the top issues of popular concern, and Honduras and El
Salvador  have recently enacted tough anti-gang legislation.  Gang violence may threaten
political stability, inhibit social development, and discourage foreign investment in
Central America.  Many analysts predict that illicit gang activities may accelerate illegal
immigration, drug smuggling, and trafficking in persons and weapons to the United
States.  Some analysts maintain that contact between gang members in both regions is
increasing, and that this tendency may serve to increase gang-related violent crime in the
United States. Others assert that unless the root causes of gang violence, which include
poverty, joblessness, and the social exclusion of at-risk youth, are addressed in a holistic
manner, the problem will continue to escalate. This report will be updated periodically.
Background
Although many Latin American countries are facing serious crime problems
associated with  gangs (maras), the largest and most violent gangs in the region operate
in Central America and Mexico. Some analysts believe these gangs could pose a serious
threat to the region’s stability.  Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador are at the epicenter
of the gang crisis, with some of the highest murder rates in the world.  In 2004, the
estimated murder rate per 100,000 people was 45.9 in Honduras, 41.2 in El Salvador, and
34.7 in Guatemala. In the United States, the corresponding figure was 5.7.  Salvadoran
police estimate that at least 60% of the 2,576 murders committed there in 2004 were
gang-related.  Estimates of the number of gang members in Central America vary widely,
but the U.S. Southern Command has placed that figure at around 70,000.  The gangs are
reportedly involved in human trafficking; drug, auto, and weapons smuggling; and
kidnaping.  In the last two years, nearly 1,100 gang members have been arrested in
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Mexico, many of whom were charging migrant smugglers to let their groups pass, or
working with Mexican drug cartels.  Regional and U.S. authorities have confirmed gang
involvement in regional drug trafficking.  The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has
found no credible evidence of a connection between Central American gangs and Al-
Qaeda or other terrorist groups.1 
Central American Street Gangs.  The major gangs operating in Central
America with ties to the United States are the  “18th Street” gang (also known as M-18),
and their main rival, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13).  The 18th Street gang was formed by
Mexican immigrants in the Rampart section of Los Angeles in the 1960s, youth who were
not accepted into existing Hispanic gangs.  It was the first Hispanic gang to accept
members from all races and to recruit members from other states.  MS-13 was created
during the 1980s by Salvadorans in Los Angeles who fled the country’s civil conflict.  It
now has an estimated 8,000 to 10,000 members in some 33 states and the District of
Columbia. Although FBI officials have described MS-13 as a “loosely structured street
gang,” it has expanded geographically, and may pose an increasing national and regional
security threat as it becomes more organized and sophisticated.2
Factors Contributing to the Gang Problem.  Several factors may have
contributed to the problem of gang violence in Central America. Scholars have identified
income inequality as the strongest predictor of violent crime rates.3  Central American
countries (aside from Costa Rica) have some of the highest income inequality indices in
the world. Other regional trends that may worsen patterns of gang violence in many
countries include extreme poverty; highly urbanized populations; growing youth
populations facing stagnant job markets; and an absence of political will to fight crime
in a holistic manner.  
Some analysts argue that U.S. immigration policy has exacerbated the gang problem
in Central America. By the mid-1990s, the civil conflicts in Central America had ended
and the United States began deporting undocumented immigrants, many with criminal
convictions, back to the region.  Between 2000 and 2004, an estimated 20,000 criminals
were sent back to Central America.  Some scholars have noted that, at least in the case of
El Salvador, the high tolerance of violence among Salvadorans, as well as the widespread
proliferation of firearms and explosives that has occurred there during and since the
country’s civil conflict of the 1980s, have contributed to the gang problem.  Still others,
especially organizations working directly with gang members, have asserted that social
exclusion and a lack of educational and job opportunities for at-risk youth are
perpetuating the gang problem.  They assert that offender reentry into society is a major
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problem, as tattooed former gang members — especially returning deportees from the
United States who are often native English speakers — have difficulty finding gainful
employment.4
Country and Regional Responses to the Gang Problem
Most gang activity in Central America has occurred in El Salvador, Honduras, and
Guatemala.  Among the Central American countries, Honduras and El Salvador have
enacted aggressive anti-gang laws, whereas Nicaragua and Panama — two countries in
which the gang problem has yet to pose a major security threat — have adopted youth
crime prevention strategies. Guatemala is considering a package of stringent anti-gang
legislation, but is also implementing some social rehabilitation and prevention programs.
Honduras.  In 2003, Honduras passed legislation that established a maximum 12-
year prison sentence for gang membership, a penalty which was then stiffened to up to 30
years in prison in December 2004. While the initial crackdown reportedly reduced crime
significantly (an 80% decline in kidnapping and a 60% decline in youth gang violence5)
and was popular with the public, it was opposed by human rights groups concerned about
abuses of gang suspects by vigilante groups and police forces, and its effects on civil
liberties.  On March 11, 2005, the Honduran government announced that it was
investigating reports mentioned in the State Department’s February 2005 Human Rights
Report that “death squads” have been formed there to target youth gang members.6
Skeptics are also concerned about the effects of the anti-gang legislation on the country’s
overcrowded prison system. In May 2004, 104 inmates, predominantly gang members,
were killed in a fire in an overcrowded San Pedro Sula prison. 
El Salvador. In July 2004, El Salvador’s Congress unanimously approved President
Tony Saca’s Super Mano Dura (“Super Firm Hand”) package of anti-gang reforms.  The
package includes reforms stiffening the penalty for gang membership to up to five years
in prison and for gang leadership to nine years.  The anti-gang legislation was approved
despite vocal criticisms by the United Nations and other groups that its tough provisions,
especially those allowing convictions of minors under 12 years of age, violate
international human rights standards.  The Salvadoran government reported that the gang
legislation led to a 14% drop in murders in 2004.  However, El Salvador recorded a total
of 552 murders in January and February 2005 alone.7  In February 2005, El Salvador’s
Legislative Assembly tightened gun ownership laws, especially for youths, to complement
existing anti-gang measures. Non-profit organizations in El Salvador have lobbied the
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government to focus more on the rehabilitation of gang members and less on enacting
tough measures that criminalize youths and raise human rights questions. 
Other Country Initiatives.  Although their efforts have received considerably less
international attention than El Salvador and Honduras, several other Central American
countries have recently developed, or are in the process of developing, a variety of
policies and programs to deal with the gang problem.  In September 2004, Panamanian
President Martin Torrijos launched Mano Amiga (“Friendly Hand”), a crime prevention
program that provides positive alternatives to gang membership for at-risk youths.  Aimed
at children aged 14-17, the government program, which is supported by a number of
domestic and international non-governmental institutions, seeks to provide access to
theater and sports activities for some 10,000 Panamanian youth. Nicaragua, like Panama,
has adopted a national youth crime prevention strategy that focuses on family, school, and
community interventions. 
In Guatemala, President Oscar Berger seems to support both strengthening law
enforcement capacity to combat criminal gangs, and expanding gang prevention and
social rehabilitation programs.  The Guatemalan Congress is considering tough anti-gang
legislation that would try gang members ages 12 and older as adults, and establish lengthy
sentences for gang leaders.8 The Ministry of Government is developing another package
of legislation that would strengthen the country’s criminal code and improve its capacity
to investigate and prosecute gang members. Many human rights organizations, wary of
past human rights abuses by Guatemalan police and security forces, oppose any measures
that would strengthen law enforcement’s power to fight the gangs. On the preventive side,
the Guatemalan government is developing programs to prevent gang-related crime and
assist disadvantaged and vulnerable youth, especially former gang members.
Regional Efforts. Central American leaders have recently begun discussing
cooperative ways to fight the problem of criminal gangs.  On March 18, 2005,  Presidents
Saca of El Salvador and Oscar Berger of Guatemala agreed to set up a joint security force
to patrol gang activity along their common border.  Regional military leaders have also
called for assistance from the U.S. Southern Command to create a multinational force to
tackle organized crime and criminal youth gangs.9 On April 1, 2005, the Central American
heads of state met in Honduras to discuss coordinating security and information-sharing
initiatives to fight the gangs.  Recognizing that security and intelligence-sharing alone
would not be sufficient to tackle the gang problem, some of the leaders said they would
approach the World Bank to find funding to support job training opportunities for former
gang members.
U.S. Efforts
Over the past year, Congress and the Administration have expressed concerns about
the problem of transnational gangs. On April 20, 2005, the Western Hemisphere
Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee held hearings on gangs
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and crime in Latin America.  Witnesses focused the bulk of their testimony on the scope
of the gang problem in Central America, and on current and proposed efforts undertaken
by various U.S. agencies, in coordination with Central American officials, to deal with
the gang problem. On April 20, 2005, Senator Lugar introduced a bill, S. 853, the North
American Cooperative Security Act (NACSA), that includes provisions that would
increase cooperation among U.S., Mexican, and Central American officials in the tracking
of gang activity and in the handling of deported gang members.  Another bill, H.R. 1279,
introduced by Representative Randy J. Forbes in March 2005, is being fiercely debated
in the House.  The bill would make gang-related offenses federal crimes requiring
mandatory sentences of at least 10 years, and enable 16- and 17-year-old gang members
to be tried as adults.  Similar legislation, S. 155, is under consideration in the Senate.
Several U.S. agencies have been actively engaged on both the law enforcement and
preventive side of dealing with Central American gangs.  On the law enforcement side,
the FBI created a special task force focusing on MS-13 in December 2004, and, on
February 23, 2005, it announced the creation of a liaison office that will be located in San
Salvador. The liaison office will coordinate regional information-sharing and anti-gang
efforts. The gang task force has introduced new regulations that will allow U.S. officials
to provide information to Central American authorities about the criminal records of
future deportees. Between FY2001 and FY2003, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) investigated over 2,200 cases involving criminal gangs
like MS-13. In the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) has created a new national anti-gang initiative called “Operation
Community Shield” that, in addition to arresting suspected gang members in the United
States, will work through its offices overseas to coordinate with foreign governments that
are also experiencing gang problems.  Since February 2005, more than 150 MS-13
members have been arrested for immigration violations.10 These law enforcement
agencies have coordinated their efforts with State Department officials responsible for
supporting law enforcement and counter-narcotics programs in Central America. 
On the preventive side, USAID worked with the Department of Justice’s
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) to create a
community policing program in some 200 municipalities in El Salvador, and is planning
a similar community crime prevention program in Guatemala.  USAID programs strive
to promote judicial reform, expand democratic governance, create economic
opportunities, strengthen education, and improve public health in Central America.  In
Guatemala, USAID’s proposed crime prevention program would create a model “youth
home” for disadvantaged youth, including former gang members, and  provide more
educational and employment opportunities for at-risk youth. In 2002, USAID joined the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) on the Inter-American Coalition for
the Prevention of Violence (IACPV).  The IACPV is a multilateral group that is helping
12 municipalities in Central America develop violence prevention plans and share
information on  violence prevention at the local and national level.  The U.S. State
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Department is reportedly developing a new initiative that would include economic
programs to address the socioeconomic roots of the gang problem.11 
Policy Approaches and Concerns
Many analysts agree with the March 15, 2005 testimony of General Bantz Craddock,
Commander of the U.S. Southern Command, before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, that finding regional solutions to the gang problem is “absolutely essential.”
Craddock maintained that the threat is one that “U.S. and partner nation security forces
must actively combat in order to protect citizens and property.” At the same time, many
analysts argue that in order to effectively reduce gang-related crime, a holistic approach
to the problem must be developed that addresses its root social, political, and economic
causes. Analysts disagree, however, as to what mix of preventive and suppressive policies
needs to be put in place in Central America to deal with the gangs, and what U.S. agency
is best equipped to oversee those anti-gang efforts.
Proponents of law enforcement solutions maintain that Central American law
enforcement officials lack the capacity and the resources to target gang leaders effectively,
conduct thorough investigations that lead to successful prosecutions, and share data.
While most U.S. observers argue that the State Department and the FBI should take the
lead in assistance to improve law enforcement capacity, others see a possible role for the
U.S. Southern Command in training regional security forces.   Critics of U.S. military
involvement in anti-gang efforts have noted that it is the State Department’s role to
provide security assistance to foreign governments, subject to human rights and
democracy concerns.12  Other proposals for increased U.S. involvement in police training
— including the creation of an International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Latin
America — have been delayed by lingering human rights concerns about providing
extensive police training to forces in the region with a history of committing human rights
abuses.  
Proponents of prevention assert that the persistent gang violence in El Salvador and
Honduras shows that law enforcement solutions alone cannot resolve the gang problem.
Some argue that prisons have become “gangland finishing schools” instead of correctional
facilities.13  Many have suggested that USAID and the Inter-American Foundation (IAF)
could take the lead on increasing gang-prevention programs in the region.  Both agencies’
efforts have been limited in recent years, however, by limited budgets for development
programs.  Further, some assert that, regardless of U.S. efforts, gang prevention programs
may not show immediate results, and will require a sustained high-level commitment by
Central American leaders to attack the underlying factors of poverty and unemployment
that have contributed to the rise in gang activity.
